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INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2010, three men brandishing guns entered a pizzeria in
South Florida and demanded cash from an employee.1 About a month later,
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the same group ran into a car parts store and forced an employee at gunpoint
to unlock the safe.2 When the employee scrambled to open the safe, the
armed men screamed in the employee’s face, threatening to kill him.3
“Eventually, when the safe did not open, [the robbers] fled.”4 As he fled
with his accomplices, Davis shot at a dog that was merely barking at them.5
The group of robbers, in a two-month span, terrorized the South
Florida community by committing a series of seven armed robberies.6
Eventually, surveillance video, DNA, and cell site location information
(“CSLI”) enabled the police to catch the violent group.7 Notably,
“[h]istorical [CSLI] showed that Davis and his accomplices had placed and
received cell phone calls in close proximity to the locations of the crimes
around the times that the crimes were committed.”8 Obtaining historical
CSLI, and the use of it as evidence during Davis’s trial, became a
controversial issue during Davis’s appeal.9 The governmental obtainment of
historical CSLI with a court order rather than a warrant has created a Fourth
Amendment debate.10 Should the government be required to demonstrate
probable cause to secure a warrant to obtain historical CSLI?11 Although
this modern constitutional debate has been considered in other circuits,
United States v. Davis12 raises an issue of first impression in the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.13
This Comment analyzes the prevailing controversy surrounding
technology, government, and privacy.14 It begins by exploring the elements
of the Fourth Amendment and the predominant cases dealing with privacy
such as Katz v. United States.15 Part two discusses what constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment and presages the discussion of why obtaining

1.
Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205
(11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928-EE).
2.
Id. at 6–7.
3.
Id. at 7.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4–9.
7.
See id. at 9–10.
8.
Id. at 10.
9.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
10.
See id.
11.
See id.
12.
754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th
Cir. 2014).
13.
Id. at 1210.
14.
See infra Parts II–V.
15.
389 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part II.
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historical CSLI does not constitute a search that will be discussed in the latter
part of the Comment.16
Part three of this Comment discusses historical CSLI and this noninvasive law enforcement practice.17 This section elaborates on the
difference between historical and real-time CSLI while explaining why
historical CSLI is non-invasive and does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.18
Part four—the largest and most significant part—focuses on the
recent Eleventh Circuit decision of Davis.19 This section contains an indepth critique of the opinion.20 Additionally, it explains the mistake the
Eleventh Circuit made in comparing the case at hand to United States v.
Jones.21 This Part then discusses other weaknesses of the opinion and
explains how and why the court’s decision was misguided.22
The purpose of this Comment is to educate the public on the
misinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment and to explain why one does not
have an expectation of privacy in public.23 Lastly, this Comment analyzes
the recent Eleventh Circuit decision and discusses why the court got it wrong
when it comes to Fourth Amendment implications and historical CSLI.24
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution warrants
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”25
The Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect the privacy of individuals from unlawful
intrusion by the government.26 An individual must have a “‘constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in order to obtain protection

16.
See infra Part II.A.
17.
See infra Part III.
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); see infra Part IV.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
No. 10-1259, slip op. 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012); see infra Part IV.
22.
See infra Part IV.
23.
See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
defendant lacked legitimate expectation of privacy when he left garbage bags filled with
contraband next to the street).
24.
See infra Parts II–IV.
25.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26.
Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored
Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location
Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 712 (2012).
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under the Fourth Amendment from an unreasonable search or seizure.27 To
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable the
Court in Katz developed a two-part test.28 The first part of the test involves
whether “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search.”29 The second part of the test asks whether
“society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”30 The
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, does not extend to what an
individual consciously reveals to the public.31 Furthermore, the expectation
of privacy, construed from the Fourth Amendment, is determined by the
context of each case.32
A.

What Constitutes a Search?

To determine whether the government has performed an
unreasonable search protected under the Fourth Amendment, one must
determine whether that person exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy which society is ready to accept as reasonable.33 If no expectation of
privacy exists then a search without a warrant does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.34 If, however, a person does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the government cannot seize evidence without a warrant supported
by probable cause.35
A person does not have a subjective expectation of privacy to what
he or she exposes to the public.36 When “a person knowingly exposes
[information] to the public,” he or she can no longer subjectively believe that
information will be kept private, and therefore will not benefit from Fourth
Amendment protections.37

27.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
28.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
30.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
31.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
32.
Malone, supra note 26, at 712.
33.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34.
See id.
35.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36.
See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996).
37.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TECHNOLOGY

There are roughly three hundred million cell phone subscribers in the
United States alone.38 Notwithstanding the country’s growing affinity with
technology, a lack of appellant precedent exists regarding what the
government can and cannot obtain from technological devices, such as cell
phones.39 It is important to understand how a cell phone works in order to
evaluate the few cases available regarding CSLI and to help predict future
decisions.40
When a person places a cell phone call, a signal is conveyed to the
nearest cell tower, and eventually to the carrier’s office.41 What experts refer
to as a cell site is the “geographical location containing the cell tower, radio
transceiver, and base station controller.”42 Anytime a person receives or
makes a cell phone call, the carrier stores that information.43 It should be
noted that even when a cell phone user is not placing a call, his or her
location can be identified because the phone is continuously interacting with
the mobile network.44 According to many scholars, due to the sophistication
of mobile devices, CSLI can be obtained within a few hundred feet.45
A.

Cell Site Location Information (“CSLI”)

What is typically referred to as CSLI has become a widely used
method for the government to help fight crime.46 Although it has recently
been used to combat criminal activity, many fear that obtainment of this
information infringes on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.47 Courts
frequently differentiate between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI, also
38.
See CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, CTIA’S Wireless Industry Survey
Results, (2013), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf.
39.
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 681 (2011).
40.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “Davis’s Fourth Amendment
argument raises issues of first impression in this circuit, and not definitively decided
elsewhere in the country”); Malone, supra note 26, at 703 (stating that “many people probably
do not consider how this technology works or what information they may inadvertently be
sharing with their cell phone company”).
41.
Malone, supra note 26, at 707–08.
42.
Christopher Fox, Comment, Checking In: Historic Cell Site Location
Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 773–74 (2012).
43.
See id.
44.
Malone, supra note 26, at 708.
45.
Id. at 704.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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known as prospective CSLI.48 This distinction between real-time and
historical CSLI is vital in the evaluation and response to privacy issues.49
Courts have yet to sufficiently address whether CSLI deserves any
constitutional protection at all.50 The major issue facing CSLI among legal
scholars is whether a warrant should be required to obtain historical CSLI.51
Before one can obtain a warrant, probable cause must be established.52 Even
before one can delve into this complex constitutional issue, two questions
must be answered.53 The first question is whether collecting CSLI is
considered a search; if it is considered a search, then there must be
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.54 Second, if obtaining CSLI is not
considered a search, then what standard must the government meet in order
to obtain historical CSLI?55
1.

Historical Versus Real-Time Location Information

Historical CSLI records are obtained from a past date in time and
only provide “the date, time, and duration of calls, whether calls are inbound
or outbound, and show the originating and terminating cell sites for calls
received or placed on the phone.”56 Cell phone carriers retain this
information for a given amount of time for business purposes.57 Real-time
CSLI permits the government in present time to track a cell phone user’s
whereabouts.58 The majority of courts faced with requests for real-time
CSLI consistently have held the material is considered “tracking information
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which requires a warrant—and thus a
showing of probable cause—before an order for disclosure of that CSLI may
48.
Malone, supra note 26, at 704.
49.
Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is
Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1875,
1884 (2011).
50.
Malone, supra note 26, at 704.
51.
Id. at 704–05.
52.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause . . . .”).
53.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1887.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical
Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2011,
at 1, 10.
57.
Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old
Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 571, 579–80 (2012).
58.
See id. at 582.
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be granted.”59 The real debate, however, regarding CSLI concerns historical
data, as seen in Davis.60 Courts have interpreted historical CSLI to be
overseen by section 201 of the Stored Communications Act.61
a.

The Stored Communications Act

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 oversees the
discovery of CSLI.62
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
encompasses the Stored Communications Act in title two and “serve[s] as the
basic statutory framework within which CSLI jurisprudence has
developed.”63 Congress passed the Stored Communications Act to combat
privacy concerns regarding the voluntary obtainment of consumers’ personal
information.64 Under the Stored Communications Act, the government
cannot simply compel communication companies, specifically cell phone
companies, to turn over private customer information such as telephone
numbers and call logs.65 In addition, the communication companies are
similarly constricted in their ability to turn over customer information to the
government.66
Under the Stored Communications Act, a government agency may
compel a communication service provider to provide the “contents of a wire
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only
pursuant to a warrant.”67 Under section 201 of the Stored Communications
Act, the government may therefore obtain the actual location of a cell phone
subscriber in real time only when the government agency obtains a warrant

59.
Malone, supra note 26, at 710; see also Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 § 108, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
60.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); Malone, supra note 26, at 710–11.
61.
Stored Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(2012); Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d
Cir. 2010); Malone, supra note 26, at 710.
62.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894.
See generally Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
63.
Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894; see also Stored Communications Act §
201.
64.
See Harkins, supra note 49, at 1899.
65.
Harkins, supra note 49 at 1896; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). “The SCA
regulates government access to stored user account information compiled by third parties in
the ordinary course of business.” Harkins, supra note 49, at 1896.
66.
Blank, supra note 56, at 11.
67.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Malone, supra note 26, at 718.
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pursuant to probable cause.68 While § 2703(a) only allows the government
to obtain real-time location information pursuant to a warrant, § 2703(c)
permits the government to obtain historical location information.69 To obtain
historical information,
[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service or remote computing service to disclose a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity:
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; . . . (B) obtains a court order
for such disclosure; [or] . . . (D) submits a formal written request
relevant to a law enforcement investigation . . . .70

Accordingly, the government, pursuant to § 2703(c), may obtain
records of cell phone subscribers with a court order by following § 2703(d)
of the codified Stored Communications Act.71
The Stored Communications Act, section 201, sets forth the
requirements needed for a government agency to obtain a court order, which
would compel a carrier to turn over the information of a subscriber.72 This
subsection of the statute allows the government to obtain the location
information “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”73
Although most scholars and courts acknowledge that “a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber”74 refers to historical CSLI, the
central dispute involves what standard should be employed by courts to
68.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). According to the Act, a
government agency may obtain the actual location of a subscriber’s communications only
when the agency obtains a warrant pursuant to probable cause required by the Fourth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
69.
U.S. CONST. amend IV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (c).
70.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), three
qualifications must be met: [F]irst, the CSP must be a provider of an electronic
communication service; second, the data may not be content information as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” an electronic communications service.

Fraser, supra note 57, at 583 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)); see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).
71.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d); Fraser, supra note 57, at 585.
72.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
73.
Id.
74.
Id. § 2703(c)(1).
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authorize disclosure of historical CSLI.75 “Over the last several years, the
prevailing view among the courts was that historical CSLI was governed by
the S[tored] C[ommunications] A[ct] and thus could be obtained without a
warrant pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order.”76
Conversely, many argue that a cell phone is really a tracking device
and thus outside the scope of the Stored Communications Act since a
tracking device is not within its definition of what is considered an electronic
communication.77 Therefore, in order for the government to compel a carrier
to provide historical CSLI of a subscriber, “the information must have been
stored by [a provider of electronic communications].”78 The Third Circuit,
however, has specifically addressed this issue and determined that a cell
phone is not considered a tracking device.79
b.

Third Circuit Opinion

In its holding, the Third Circuit articulated that by its nature, CSLI is
not considered a tracking device and therefore should not be held to the
higher probable cause standard.80 The Third Circuit decision was the first on
the appellate level that decided “whether a court can deny a [g]overnment
application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the [g]overnment has satisfied its
burden of proof under that provision.”81 The government in In re
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government82
submitted a request to the magistrate judge for a court order to obtain
75.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010).
76.
Malone, supra note 26, at 721; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
77.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12) (2012); Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
78.
Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
79.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 309, 313.
80.
Id. at 313.
We therefore cannot accept the MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be
considered information from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires
probable cause for its production.
In sum, we hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under §
2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination. . . . The MJ erred in allowing her impressions of the general
expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into anything else. We
also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than probable cause, a conclusion
that . . . is supported by the legislative history.

Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
81.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 305–06.
82.
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
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historical CSLI.83 The magistrate judge denied the government’s request and
insisted on a government showing of probable cause when obtaining CSLI.84
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the magistrate’s ruling and held
“that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a [court] order and that
such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination.”85
Notwithstanding the Third Circuit decision, some still believe that a
cell phone is considered a tracking device when the government is
attempting to obtain real-time or prospective data.86 Although many scholars
support this contention, this Comment from here on focuses solely on
historical CSLI.87
Even though government agencies frequently use historical CSLI to
investigate criminal activity throughout the country,88 a few scholars and
courts believe section 2703(d) should be discarded and replaced with a newer
and higher standard of probable cause.89 The Third Circuit, however, has
held that to determine what standard a court should employ when a
government agency attempts to obtain historical CSLI is not an issue for the
courts to decide, and that the standard should, instead, be left up to
Congress.90
We respectfully suggest that if Congress intended to circumscribe
the discretion it gave to magistrates under § 2703(d) then
Congress, as the representative of the people, would have so
provided. Congress would, of course, be aware that such a statute
mandating the issuance of a § 2703(d) order without requiring
probable cause and based only on the Government’s word may
evoke protests by cell phone users concerned about their privacy.
The considerations for and against such a requirement would be
for Congress to balance. A court is not the appropriate forum for

83.
Id. at 305.
84.
Id. at 305, 308.
85.
Id. at 313. “We also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than
probable cause, a conclusion that . . . is supported by the legislative history.” Id.
86.
Malone, supra note 26, at 724–25.
87.
E.g., id., at 724–25; see infra Parts III–V.
88.
See Malone, supra note 26, at 724.
89.
See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010);
Malone, supra note 26, 704–05.
90.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 319.
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such balancing, and we decline to take a step to which Congress is
silent.91

This precedent-setting decision offered by the Third Circuit—while
one of the first federal circuit court decisions regarding historical CSLI—
most likely will determine how future courts will examine the governmental
obtainment of historical CSLI.92
IV.

UNITED STATES V. DAVIS: WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT
WRONG

The next section of this Comment focuses on the misguided decision
of the Eleventh Circuit in Davis.93 This section will provide evidence
showing why the court was misguided.94
A.

No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Third Party Doctrine

Although the Eleventh Circuit claims that a cell phone subscriber has
a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation of privacy may not be
one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.95 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly articulated that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to
the information a person voluntarily reveals to a third party.96 Accordingly,
if historical CSLI is considered to be information that is voluntarily given to
a third party, then it is presumed that the government obtainment of historical
CSLI is not considered a search and no warrant is required.97 To support this
argument, many opponents of a warrant requirement standard cite to the
Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller.98
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy to the voluntary information provided to a bank.99
Before his trial, the respondent sought to suppress bank records obtained

91.
Id.
92.
Malone, supra note 26, at 723.
93.
See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); infra Part IV.A–E.
94.
See infra Part IV.A–E.
95.
Malone, supra note 26, at 712, 733.
96.
Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506
(2012).
97.
Id.
98.
425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
743–44 (1979).
99.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45.
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through a purportedly flawed subpoena.100 The lower court denied his
motion and respondent was subsequently convicted on conspiracy charges.101
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court later affirmed
the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.102 Additionally, in its
decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a person conveys personal
information to a third party, that person anticipates that the third party will
inevitably convey that personal information to the government.103
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress . . . the
expressed purpose of which . . . to require records to be maintained
because they [are useful] “in criminal . . . investigations and
proceedings.”104

Banks retain a record of their customers’ accounts to comply with
the Bank Secrecy Act, which is “merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a
proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that records
are available when they are needed.”105 The Court concluded that because
customers are aware that the information within their account is kept by the
bank—a third party—there is no Fourth Amendment right violated when that
information is conveyed to law enforcement.106
In addition to citing Miller, challengers to the warrant requirement
standard for historical CSLI also cite the Court’s decision in Smith v.
Maryland107 to bolster their argument.108 In that case the Court held—three
years after Miller—that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the telephone numbers they dialed.109 In Smith, the government
obtained an installation of a pen register on the petitioner’s phone to collect
100.
Id. at 436.
101.
Id. at 436–37.
102.
Id. at 437, 440.
103.
Rothstein, supra note 96, at 507 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
104.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1976)).
105.
Id. at 444.
106.
Id. at 444–45.
107.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
108.
See id. at 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 446; In re Application of
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
109.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
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the phone numbers he dialed.110 The police installed the pen register on the
petitioner’s phone without obtaining a warrant or court order.111 The
petitioner was suspected of participating in a robbery and subsequently
making harassing phone calls to his victim.112 With the help of the pen
register, the police were able to identify the petitioner as the robbery
suspect.113 The victim was ultimately able to identify her robber, and
thereafter, the petitioner was arrested.114 Prior to his trial, the petitioner
sought to suppress all evidence obtained from the pen register on the
contention it violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.115 The lower court ultimately denied the petitioner’s
motion to suppress and the appeal went all the way to the Supreme Court.116
Eventually, the Supreme Court held that because the information is
voluntarily conveyed to a third party, a person does not have a subjective
expectation of privacy to the phone numbers he or she dials.117 In addition,
most people are aware that the carrier retains a record of the numbers dialed
because they eventually appear on a monthly telephone bill.118
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain
secret.119

The petitioner attempted to argue that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy because the telephone calls originated in his house.120
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court quickly shut down this argument by stating
“[r]egardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the
110.
Id. at 737.
111.
Id.
112.
See id.
113.
Id.
114.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
115.
Id. at 737–38.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 743–44; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 588. “Further, in Smith v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court found that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed
records of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and therefore assumed the risk
that those records would be revealed to the police.” Fraser, supra note 57, at 588.
118.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
119.
Id. at 743.
120.
Id.
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telephone company in . . . the same way if he wished to complete his call.
The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some
other phone could make no conceivable difference . . . .”121 Even if he had
an expectation of privacy to his dialed telephone numbers, the Supreme
Court further noted that society is not willing to acknowledge this
expectation of privacy as reasonable.122
B.

Historical CSLI: A Voluntary Disclosure to a Third Party

The underlying policy argument in both Miller and Smith is
identical: When a person voluntarily reveals information to a third party
they surrender any legitimate expectation of privacy over that information.123
Courts have extended the third party argument to comprise information
regarding:
“[C]redit card statements, electric utility records, motel
registration records, and employment records.”124 Proponents of a warrant
requirement, however, challenge this line of reasoning and contend “cell
phones automatically register with cell phone towers and send location
information without any voluntary action by the user.”125 Although this may
be the case, the automatic registration of a cell phone with a tower is an
acknowledged consequence of possessing a cell phone.126
Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the
government uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes
that law enforcement agencies have reported and solved with the
help of CSLI.127

The Third Circuit, however, attempted to argue that a typical cell
phone user likely does not even realize that a carrier retains their location

121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43
(1976); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012).
“Historical CSLI has been analogized with other types of personal records, such as bank
records, that courts have ruled are [freely given] to a third party.” Malone, supra note 26, at
739.
124.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
125.
Malone, supra note 26, at 739.
126.
Id.
127.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789.
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information.128 However, this argument can easily be invalidated.129 When a
cell phone user places a call, the user must undoubtedly anticipate that their
carrier will determine their call location for billing purposes.130 How would
a carrier determine the proper billing rate for a cell phone call without
determining the subscriber’s location when making the call?131 Therefore, a
subscriber must recognize that their cell phone provider retains their location
information as part of the ordinary course of business.132
An additional argument for why historical CSLI is considered a
voluntary conveyance of information is because a cell phone user can easily
turn off their phone, thereby preventing the registration of their location with
a cell tower.133 In addition, most cell phone thieves immediately turn off the
stolen phone because they understand that their location will likely be
traceable.134 “[T]he prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions and
subscribers’ increased use of these services directly undermine the position
that cell phone customers are not voluntarily sharing their location
information with [cell site providers].”135
1.

Comparison to United States v. Davis

Similar to the telephone numbers dialed in Smith,136 and the bank
information provided to the bank in Miller,137 the defendant in Davis
128.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); Malone,
supra note 26, at 739.
129.
See Malone, supra note 26, at 739.
130.
Id. at 739–40.
131.
See id.
[A]s users become more aware of cell phone technology, there will no longer be a
widespread lack of knowledge regarding the type of location data cell phone
companies routinely collect. If people continue to use their cell phones even after
they learn and understand how historical CSLI is gathered and maintained, they
will have a much harder time arguing that the CSLI has not been voluntarily
conveyed.

Id. at 740.
132.
Id. at 739–40.
133.
Malone, supra note 26, at 740.
134.
Garth Johnston, Smart Thieves Wise Up to Smart Phones: Turn ‘Em Off
to Disable Tracking, GOTHAMIST (March 26, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2012/
03/26/smart_crooks_wise_up_on_smart_phone.php.
135.
Fox, supra note 42, at 788.
Therefore, a cell phone user has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI
that the [cell site provider] records when the user makes or receives a call because
the subscriber has voluntarily shared this information with the [cell site provider]
and assumes the risk that the [cell site provider] may turn the information over to
law enforcement agencies.

Id. at 788–89.
136.
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voluntarily transmitted his location to cell towers in order to make and
receive calls.138 The carrier then retained the location information of the
defendant for its personal business records.139 “[H]istorical [CSLI] are
records created and kept by third parties that are voluntarily conveyed to
those third parties by their customers. As part of the ordinary course of
business, cell[] phone companies collect information that identifies the cell[]
towers through which a person’s calls are routed.”140
C.

The Beeper Cases

Soon after the decisions of United States v. Knotts141 and United
States v. Karo,142 the Supreme Court decided two cases within a two-term
period that addressed the issue of governmental use of tracking devices in
determining the whereabouts of suspected drug manufacturers.143 These two
cases assist in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy to his or her precise location.144 Additionally, “[t]hese cases are
especially apt when discussing historical CSLI because they dealt with a
technology that many critics of the current interpretation of the SCA
compare to cell phones: [T]racking devices.”145
Employing the use of beepers allows law enforcement
agents to track the object the beeper has been attached to by
following the emitted signals, similar to the way in which one can
compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the
movements of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in realtime.146

In Knotts, law enforcement agents positioned a tracking beeper in a
container that was holding chloroform that agents suspected was used by the
defendants in their production of drugs.147 Law enforcement agents were
able to track the container to a remote cabin.148 With the assistance of the
137.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1976).
138.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209–10, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g
granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
139.
Id. at 1209–10.
140.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012).
141.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
142.
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
143.
Fox, supra note 42, at 780.
144.
Malone, supra note 26, at 713.
145.
Id.
146.
Fox, supra note 42, at 780 (footnote omitted).
147.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
148.
Id.
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beeper and surveillance of the defendant’s cabin, the agents were able to
obtain a search warrant.149 During the execution of the search warrant,
agents discovered a drug laboratory and subsequently arrested the
defendant.150
The defendant sought to suppress the evidence law
enforcement obtained through the warrantless tracking of the beeper.151
After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant was convicted and
sentenced for producing a controlled substance.152
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction
and found the use of the beeper to track the defendant was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.153 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
Eighth Circuit’s decision and found the defendant’s expectation of privacy
was not violated because the warrantless tracking of the beeper was not a
search within the Fourth Amendment.154 The Court reasoned that “[t]he
governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper . . . amounted
principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways.”155 Additionally, the Court noted that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy when traveling in a car on a public road because that
person voluntarily conveys that information to the public.156 The Court
therefore once again concluded that a person cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to what is voluntarily conveyed to the public.157
A similar fact pattern involving a beeper occurred in Karo.158 After
the defendants purchased cans of ether from a confidential informant that
were used in the extraction of cocaine from clothes that had been imported
into the United States, the government secured a warrant that allowed the
installation and tracking of a beeper in one of the cans.159 Once the
defendant picked the cans of ether up from the informant, the agents then
followed the defendant to his home.160 After the cans were moved to a
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–82.

When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
157.
Id. at 281–82.
158.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
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number of locations, through the use of the beeper, the government agents
finally discovered that the cans were at the house rented by the defendants.161
The agents then obtained a warrant to search the house and subsequently
discovered the defendants’ cocaine and laboratory paraphernalia.162 The
defendants were consequently arrested and moved to suppress the evidence
derived from the initial warrant to install the beeper.163
After the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s suppression of evidence, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.164 The Court ultimately decided that although the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the government installed
the beeper on the ether can, the monitoring of the can when it was inside the
defendant’s home was considered an unreasonable search.165 Unlike Knotts,
as the Court noted, the beeper in Karo showed that it was inside the
defendants’ home. 166 The Court furthermore held that the use of a beeper to
track a person in his or her private residence that is not open to visual
surveillance is considered a search within the Fourth Amendment.167
Where exactly the beepers were broadcasting their precise location is
the key difference between these two cases.168 The most significant question
to ask when one is studying electronic surveillance cases is “what kind of
information can be collected and whether that sort of information would be
freely available to, say, a passerby?”169 Moreover, these two cases inevitably
created a public/private distinction to evaluate the use of warrantless tracking
devices and their potential Fourth Amendment implications.170

161.
Id. at 708–10.
162.
Id. at 710.
163.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 710. “The [d]istrict [c]ourt granted respondents’
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the . . . residence on the grounds that the
initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid and that the . . . seizure was the tainted fruit of
an unauthorized installation and monitoring of that beeper.” Id.
164.
Id. at 710–11.
165.
Id. at 713, 715.
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course,
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the
interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.

Id. at 715.
166.
(1983).
167.
168.
169.
170.
U.S. at 284.

Karo, 468 U.S. at 710, 715; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
Malone, supra note 26, at 715.
Id. at 716.
Fox, supra note 42, at 782; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 468
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CSLI Differs from Beeper Cases

Supporters of a warrant requirement for CSLI argue that the same
analysis used in the beeper cases should be employed in CSLI cases.171
Employing the same public/private analysis, however, would be
superfluous.172
[C]urrently CSLI is not consistently accurate enough to implicate
the home of a suspect, but rather only indicates the general area
where the call was made from, which may or may not give rise to
the inference that the defendant was at home. Knotts and Karo
make clear that acquiring location information about an object in
the vicinity of the home or other private space, but not within its
interior, is not a search.173

In addition, “historical CSLI does not convey information about the
interior of a home.”174 Unlike the beeper cases that provide a precise
location of the tracking device, historical CSLI typically only reveals the
location of a cell phone within roughly 200 feet.175
[T]he historical [CSLI] at issue identif[ies] only the closest cell[]
tower to the Defendants’ phones, and not the precise location of
the Defendants themselves. . . . Indeed, even with an ever-denser
cell[] tower grid, such precision is impossible. Moreover, even if
cell site records could definitively indicate that an individual is in
his home, that information only reveals that a person made or
received a phone call while at home—in other words, nonincriminatory information that is clearly obtainable via the
constitutional pen register at issue in Smith v. Maryland.176

171.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789. “Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly
accurate, it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo, as that information will
allow law enforcement to determine if a suspect is in his or her home.” Fraser, supra note 57,
at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
172.
See Fraser, supra note 57, at 611–12. “The tracker beeper cases simply do
not carry over well to a tracking device that has other uses; there is a need for a different
distinction in CSLI analysis.” Id. at 612.
173.
Id. at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
174.
Malone, supra note 26, at 737.
175.
Id. “Unless a person is standing in the middle of a residence and the walls
are 100 feet away in any direction, his historical CSLI will not be precise enough to prove that
he is actually inside the walls of the residence and secluded from the public eye.” Id.
176.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (D. Md. 2012); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Malone, supra note 26, at 738. “CSLI
cannot indicate with certainty anything about the interior of a private residence. Thus, the
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Consequently, unlike the more precise tracking of a beeper,
historical CSLI does not provide a precise location of a cell phone because
the cell tower only gives an approximate location.177 Because historical
CSLI substantially differs from beeper tracking, “CSLI falls outside of the
traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Accordingly, when a law
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI information to
approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.”178
D.

United States v. Jones

The most recent case that dealt with Fourth Amendment implications
on tracking devices occurred in United States v. Jones.179 In Jones, the
government secured a search warrant to install a GPS on a vehicle that was
registered to the respondent’s wife.180 The government suspected the
respondent of trafficking drugs through his nightclub and accordingly sought
the warrant to allow the government to install the electronic tracking
device.181 The warrant authorized the government to install and track the car
in the District of Columbia for only ten days.182 Disobeying the terms of the
warrant, the government installed the device in Maryland on the eleventh
day.183 Signals from the device documented the vehicle’s location within
roughly one hundred feet.184 With help from the tracking device, the
government was able to obtain an indictment against the respondent and

Fourth Amendment does not protect historical CSLI, and current law does not require a
warrant or probable cause to obtain historical CSLI.” Malone, supra note 26, at 738.
177.
Fox, supra note 42, at 789. “This information does not provide the actual
location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower location used to carry a call
and because location calculations based on cell towers give only an approximation of a
subscriber’s phone’s location.” Id. at 789.
178.
Id. at 790.
If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate location of the cell phone at the
initiation of the call can be computed. This approximate location, however,
provides the general area of the caller, not the exact location. A tracking beeper, on
the other hand, can be traced to a precise location. . . . [H]istoric CSLI cannot show
that a subscriber was at a particular place at a particular time; it can only show that
the phone was in a general area.

Id. at 789–90.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012).
Id. at 1–2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/3

20

Carlton: Why The Eleventh Circuit Got It Wrong: Historical Cell Site Locat

2015]

WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG

259

several of his co-conspirators, charging them with conspiracy to distribute
cocaine.185
Prior to trial, the respondent sought to suppress the evidence
obtained from the GPS tracking, arguing that the installation and tracking of
the GPS on the vehicle was an unreasonable search within the Fourth
Amendment.186 The court, however, only suppressed the evidence obtained
through the GPS while the vehicle was parked in the garage of the
respondent’s house.187 Subsequently, the respondent was convicted at
trial.188 The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the evidence acquired from the warrantless tracking of the GPS
violated the Fourth Amendment.189
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, indicated that the case was primarily about the physical
intrusion by the government onto private property for the sole purpose of
obtaining evidence.190 “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion
would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.”191 The Court, therefore, predominantly
based its decision on the common law trespass doctrine.192 The physical
trespass by the government to install the GPS device, outside the
requirements set forth by the warrant, violated the respondent’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.193
1.

Why Jones Analysis Does Not Apply

The Eleventh Circuit in Davis erroneously applied the analysis set
forth by the Supreme Court in Jones to arrive at its holding.194 Several
reasons exist why the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to
historical CSLI cases.195

185.
Id. at 2–3.
186.
Id. at 2.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 3.
189.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op at 3.
190.
Id. at 4.
191.
Id. at 4.
192.
Id. “The majority decided only that a search occurs when the government
trespasses on an individual’s property for the purpose of gathering information.” Rothstein,
supra note 96, at 501.
193.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–3, 12.
194.
See id. at 3–4; United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212, 1214 (11th
Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
195.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3–4; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620.
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First, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that GPS tracking and CSLI are
analogous.196 As previously discussed, the tracking produced by a GPS and
historical CSLI yield different levels of accuracy when determining an
individual’s location.197 In Jones, the device was attached to a car, and the
law enforcement agents tracked its movements in real-time.198 In Davis,
however, the government did not track the suspects movements in real-time;
the government simply obtained historical CSLI which does not track an
individual’s precise real-time movements.199 “Historical cell site location
data is, as its name implies, historical—the information revealed by such data
exposes to the government only where a suspect was and not where he is.”200
In addition, unlike Jones, the agents in Davis obtained records from
the defendant’s cell phone carrier that only revealed the vicinity in which he
made or received a cell phone call.201 And, unlike Jones, “this information
can only reveal the general vicinity in which a cell[] phone is used.”202 The
court even noted that “[w]e do not doubt that there may be a difference in
precision, but that is not to say that the difference in precision has
constitutional significance.”203 This argument is flawed because a person
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to everything, and a
person’s precise location is vital in determining whether their Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated.204 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
erred when it compared the tracking device employed in Jones to the
historical CSLI employed in Davis.205
Next, the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to the Davis
case because there was no trespass in Davis.206 Nevertheless, although the
court addresses this factual distinction, it still used Jones to arrive at its
decision.207
[I]n the controversy before us there was no GPS device, no
placement, and no physical trespass. Therefore, although Jones
clearly removes all doubt as to whether electronically transmitted
196.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213.
197.
See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text.
198.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2.
199.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 613–14.
200.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (D. Md. 2012).
201.
Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2; Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; Graham,
846 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
202.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at
2.
203.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216.
204.
See e.g., Fraser, supra note 57, at 609–13.
205.
See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213–14, 1216; Fraser, supra note 57, at 613.
206.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 4.
207.
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
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location information can be protected by the Fourth Amendment it
is not determinative as to whether the information in this case is so
protected. The answer to that question is tied up with the
emergence of the privacy theory of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. While Jones is not controlling, we reiterate that it is
instructive.208

Such an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s analysis set forth in Jones
further demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit got it wrong.209 Because the
obtainment of one’s historical CSLI does not involve a physical trespass to
one’s property, the Eleventh Circuit should not have employed the trespass
theory to analyze the possible Fourth Amendment implications.210 Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit should have employed the analysis set forth in Katz—to
determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society was willing to accept as reasonable—to his CSLI.211
E.

Katz Analysis Applied to Davis

If the Eleventh Circuit decided to instead employ the Katz analysis it
would have found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.212 Conversely, even if the court found that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it would have found that society would
not be willing to accept that expectation of privacy as reasonable because his
location was voluntarily conveyed to the public through his cell phone
provider.213
The Eleventh Circuit stated that:
[E]ven on a person’s first visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a
bookie, or a priest, one may assume that the visit is private if it
was not conducted in a public way. One’s cell phone, unlike an
automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere. Thus, the
208.
209.

Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620.

While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of Jones will be, the
Court’s narrow holding that the installation and use of the GPS device was a search
provides little guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain historical
CSLI records. First, with respect to cell phones, the government does not have to
install the devise used to generate location information—the user is already
carrying around his or her cell phone.

Fraser, supra note 57, at 620; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
210.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012).
211.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Graham, 846 F.
Supp. 2d at 396.
212.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 396–401.
213.
See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99; Malone, supra note 26, at 733.
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exposure of the [CSLI] can convert what would otherwise be a
private event into a public one. . . . [CSLI] is private in nature
rather than being public.214

However, as previously indicated, “historical CSLI are the
provider’s business records, and are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”215 Because the defendant’s historical CSLI was retained by
his cell phone provider within its ordinary course of business, the defendant
had no expectation of privacy to those records and consequently his Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated.216 Therefore, because the Eleventh
Circuit disregarded the third party doctrine in arriving at its decision, it got it
wrong when it comes to historical CSLI and the Fourth Amendment.217
V.

CONCLUSION

Requiring a warrant each time law enforcement wishes to obtain
historical CSLI would hinder the efforts of law enforcement and slow down
their ability to investigate crimes.218 While society’s dependence on cell
phones continues to grow and the government’s need to solve crimes
continuously persists, a uniform standard to obtain historical CSLI needs to
be addressed by Congress.219 However, as the Third Circuit articulated, it is
not for the courts to decide what standard should be employed to obtain these
records, but it is for Congress to decide.220 The Eleventh Circuit failed to
follow its sister circuit in this regard.221
As discussed at length, historical CSLI is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.222 The Stored Communications Act223 helps protect citizens
and enables law enforcement to efficiently do their job.224 Because a cell
phone user does not have a legitimate expectation to privacy to the records
voluntarily conveyed to their cell phone provider, the Fourth Amendment is
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222.
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223.
See generally Stored Communications Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710 (2012).
224.
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not implicated.225 The Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze Davis properly and
consequently its decision was misguided.226
After the submission of this Comment, the government filed a
petition for rehearing en banc.227 With a majority of judges agreeing in favor
of rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately vacated the Davis decision.228
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226.
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